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Abstract
On a given network, a Patroller and Attacker play the following win-lose game: The Patroller
adopts a periodic walk on the network while the Attacker chooses a node and two consecutive
periods (to attack there). The Patroller wins if he successfully intercepts the attack, that is, if
he occupies the attacked node in one of the two periods of the attack. We solve this game in
mixed strategies for line graphs, the first class of graphs to be solved for the periodic patrolling
game. We also solve the game for arbitrary graphs when the period is even.
Keywords: Game Theory, Networks, Search/Surveillance
1 Introduction
The periodic patrolling game was introduced in Alpern et al. (2011) to model the defense of
the nodes of a network from attack by an antagonistic opponent. This is a discrete game model
in which the network is modeled as a graph, the Patroller chooses a walk on the graph with
a given period and the Attacker picks a node and a discrete time interval of fixed duration
m for his attack. The Patroller wins the game if he is present at the attacked node during
the time interval in which it is attacked, in which case we say that he intercepts the attack.
Otherwise the Attacker wins. Compared with other patrolling models in the literature, for
example Chung et al. (2011), the patrolling game model represents only an idealization of
the patrolling problem. However it is the only model in which the Patroller and Attacker are
treated symmetrically, rather than the more usual Stackelberg approach where the Patroller
picks his strategy first.
This paper considers the periodic patrolling game on general graphs and then in more
detail on the class of line graphs Ln consisting of n nodes 1, 2, . . . , n with consecutive numbers
considered to be adjacent. The case of a unit attack duration m = 1 is covered by the field of
geometric games as defined by Ruckle (1983), so we here consider the next smallest duration
m = 2, which is the only case thus far susceptible to analysis. We note that the easier version of
non-periodic patrolling games is able to handle line graphs for larger values of m, as recently
solved by Papadaki et al. (2016). It is likely that the techniques introduced here will be
extended to larger attack durations in the future, but clearly additional ideas will be required.
In the case of the line graph, our discrete model could be applied for example to the problem
of patrolling, possibly with a sniffer dog, a bank of linearly arranged airport security scanners,
or a mountainous border with a discrete set of passes that can be crossed. In such cases, the
“nodes” can be attacked at any time, around the clock, so the period T is likely to be the
number of nodes that can be patrolled in a day. Other possiblities for defining T might be the
attention span of the sniffer dog or the time between refueling by a mobile vehicle, robot or
UAV.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature, then
in Section 3 we formally define the game. In Section 4 we discuss some results for general
graphs, showing how the game can be solved using notions from fractional graph theory if the
patrol period is even. We then give a complete solution to the game played on a line graph in
Section 5. In Section 6 we consider an extension of the game to the case of multiple patrollers,
and show how our results on the line may be extended to this setting. Finally, we conclude in
Section 7.
1
2 Literature review
The problem of patrolling a border or channel against attack or infiltration goes back to the
classical work of Morse and Kimball (1951). Since then many attempts have been made to
improve the theory and practice of patrolling. Washburn (1982) considers an infiltrator who
wants to maximize the probability of getting across a line in a channel. The case where the
channel is blocked by fixed barriers has been consider by Baston and Bostock (1987) and
the case when the barriers are moving has been analyzed by Washburn (2010). The case
of a thick infiltrator has been considered by Baston and Kikuta (2009). If there are many
infiltrators and they arrive in a Poisson manner, the analysis is given by Szechtman et al.
(2008). Multiple infiltrators are also considered by Zoroa et al. (2012) where the infiltration
is through a circular rather than a linear boundary. Multiple patrollers, when only some
portions of the boundary need to be protected, are considered by Collins et al. (2013), who
show how the problem can be divided up. Papadaki et al. (2016) consider the discrete border
patrol problem, where the infiltration can only be accomplished at certain points of the border
(perhaps mountain passes). When patrollers are restricted to periodic patrols, as here, the
analysis of the continuous problem (with elements such as turning radius included) has been
analyzed by Chung et al. (2011).
The more general problem of patrolling an arbitrary network against attacks at its nodes
has been modeled as a game by Alpern et al. (2011), including a definition of the periodic
patrolling game which we adopt here. Lin et al. (2013) developed more general approximate
methods which cover such extensions as varying values for attacks at different nodes. Their
methods, extended in Lin et al. (2014) to imperfect detection, can solve large scale problems.
In the computer science literature, patrolling games with mobile robots and a Stackelberg
model have been developed by Basilico et al. (2009, 2012). Multi vehicle patrolling problems
have been solved by Hochbaum et al. (2014).
Infiltration games without mobile patrollers are analyzed in Garnaev et al. (1997), Alpern
(1992), Baston and Garnaev (1996) and Baston and Kikuta (2004, 2009).
3 Formal Definition of the (periodic) Patrolling Game
In this section we formally define the patrolling game. There are three parameters: a graph
Q = Q(N,E) (where N is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges of Q), a period T , and an
attack duration m (which we will take as 2 in this paper). The Attacker chooses a node i of Q
to attack and a time interval of m consecutive periods in which to attack it. These m periods
can be considered as an arc of the time circle T = {1, 2, . . . , T, T + 1 = 1}, on which arithmetic
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is carried out modulo T . So in the periodic game with T = 24 and m = 5, for example, a valid
Attacker strategy would be the “overnight” attack, with attack interval J = {22, 23, 24, 1, 2}.
Note that if Q has n nodes, then the number of possible attacks is given by nT, and the mixed
attack strategy which chooses among them equiprobably will be called the uniform attack
strategy. To foil the attack, the Patroller walks along the graph in an attempt to intercept it,
that is, to be at the attacked node at some time during the attack interval. More precisely,
a patrol is a walk w on Q with period T , that is, w : {1, 2, . . .} → N with w(t) and w(t + 1)
the same or adjacent nodes and w (t+ T ) = w (T ) for all t. A patrol w intercepts an attack at
node i during attack interval J if i ∈ w (J) or equivalently if w (t) = i for some time t in the
attack interval J . In such a case we say that the Patroller wins, and the payoff is 1; otherwise
we say the Attacker wins, and the payoff is 0. Thus the payoff of the game corresponding to
mixed strategies is the probability that the Patroller intercepts the attack. The value V of the
game is the expected payoff (interception probability) with optimal play on both sides.
We note that in Alpern et al. (2011), this game is called the periodic patrolling game
(one of two forms of the game considered there) and the value is denoted V p. We assume
throughout that the period is at least 2 and that the graph Q has at least n = 2 nodes.
4 General Graphs
In this section we obtain some bounds on the value V of the patrolling game on a general graph.
The tools comprise the well known covering and independence numbers and a decomposition
result taken from Alpern et al. (2011).
4.1 Covering and independence numbers I and C.
We recall some elementary definitions about a graph Q. A set of nodes is called independent
if no two of them are adjacent. The maximum cardinality of an independent set is called the
independence number I. Similarly a set of edges is called a covering set if every node of the
graph is incident to one of these edges. The minimum cardinality of a covering set is called the
covering number C of the graph. If I is a set of nodes and C is a covering set of edges there is,
by the definition of covering set, a function f : I → C such that the edge f (i) is incident to
node i for all i ∈ I. If I is an independent set then, by the definition of independent set, the
function f is injective, so that |I| ≤ |C| and hence I ≤ C.
Suppose the Attacker attacks in some fixed time interval {t, t+1} at a node chosen equiprob-
ably from a set of I independent nodes. We call this an independent attack strategy. If a patrol
intercepts one of these attacks at node i ∈ I at time t, he cannot intercept another at time
t + 1, since none of the other attacks are at a node adjacent to i. Hence the probability of
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intercepting an attack cannot exceed 1/I and therefore V ≤ 1/I. Next suppose T is even.
In this case the Patroller fixes a covering set of C edges, picks a single edge amongst these
randomly, and on that edge goes back and forth in an oscillation of length T . We call this
Patroller mixed strategy an unbiased covering strategy, or, if the covering set consists of only
an edge, an unbiased oscillation. Every node is visited by one of these patrols in every pair of
consecutive time periods, and hence every attack of duration m = 2 is intercepted by at least
one of these C patrols. Therefore the Patroller wins with probability at least 1/C. Hence we
have shown the following.
Lemma 1 The value of the Patrolling Game on any graph Q satisfies
V ≤ 1/I, and futhermore (1)
1/C ≤ V ≤ 1/I, if T is even. (2)
A graph is called bipartite if its nodes can be partitioned into two sets such that no two
nodes within the same set are adjacent. For bipartite graphs, we can say more.
Proposition 2 Let Q be a bipartite graph. Then C = I and the value V satisfies
V =
1
C =
1
I , if T is even, and (3)(
2T − 1
2T
)
1
C =
(
2T − 1
2T
)
1
I ≤ V ≤
1
I if T is odd. (4)
Proof. The first result (3) follows immediately from (2) and the well known fact (Konig’s
Theorem) that C = I for bipartite graphs. The upper bound of (4) follows from (1). For the
lower bound let {ek}Ck=1 be a covering set of C edges, and let wk denote the randomized walk
of period T which oscillates on ek except that it stays at a randomly chosen node of ek for
two consecutive times, also randomly chosen. We call this strategy of the Patroller a biased
covering strategy. For example if T = 7 and the endpoints of ek are a and b, the repeated
sequence might be ababbab. Consider the Patroller strategy that chooses one of the randomized
walks wk equiprobably. If one of the nodes of ek is attacked then the attack is detected if the
Patroller chooses wk (which happens with probabiliy 1/C) and the Patroller does not happen
to choose to repeat this node for two consecutive periods that coincide with the time of attack
(this happens with probability 1 − 1/(2T ). So the total probabilty the attack is detected is
(1/C) (1− 1/ (2T )), giving the lower bound for the value in (4).
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We now give an example based on Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 for the line graph L7 with
nodes {1, . . . , 7} and edges (i, i+ 1) i = 1, . . . , 6. Since Ln is bipartite we can use the result in
(3). We demonstrate the result for even period T = 12 (any even period would suffice but we
pick 12 to be able to compare it with a later example in Section 5.6). A minimum covering set
is {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6), (6, 7)} and thus C = 4. An unbiased covering strategy for the Patroller
consists of picking an edge at random from a minimum covering set (with probability 1/4) and
performing an oscillation on that edge with period T = 12. Since T = 12 is even the oscillations
performed on the chosen edges are unbiased (nodes are visited equally often). This is shown
in Figure 1. This Patroller strategy intercepts attacks at nodes 1 − 5, 7 with probability 1/4
and at node 6 with probability 1/2. Thus, the Patroller at worst can guarantee interception
probability of at least 1/4. The Attacker would use the independent attack strategy and attack
equiprobably on the independent set {1, 3, 5, 7}, which clearly guarantees him interception
probability of at most 1/4. This gives the value of the game V = 1/C = 1/4.
Figure 1: Unbiased covering strategy for the Patroller to oscillate on edges
{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6), (6, 7)} of this minimum covering set.
The following gives an alternative upper bound to 1/I on V based on the uniform attack
strategy, which chooses equiprobably among the nT possible attacks (pure strategies). The
reason that there are nT pure strategies is because in a game with period T , there are T
periods that the attacker can start the attack: 1, 2, . . . , T, T + 1 = 1, at each node. The new
upper bound is sometimes but not always better (lower) than 1/I.
Proposition 3 By adopting the uniform strategy on a graph Q, the Patroller ensures the value
of the periodic patrol game is bounded above by 2/n. If T is odd and Q is bipartite, then the
upper bound can be strengthened to (2T − 1)/(nT ).
Proof. Suppose the Attacker adopts the uniform strategy on a graph Q, and let w be
any Patroller pure strategy. If w(t) = i and w(t + 1) = j 6= i then in these two periods the
Patroller can intercept at most four pure Attacker strategies, namely [i, (t− 1, t)], [i, (t, t+ 1)]
and [j, (t, t + 1))], [j, (t + 1, t + 2))], so 2 in each period and 2T in all. If i = j then only the
5
three attacks [i, (t− 1, t)], [i, (t, t+ 1)] and [i, (t+ 1, t+ 2)] can be intercepted. Since there are
nT possible attacks, we have V ≤ (2T )/(nT ) = 2/n.
If T is odd and Q is bipartite then w(t) = w(t + 1) for some t, so at most 2T − 1 attacks
can be intercepted. Hence V ≤ 2T−1nT .
Note that it follows from the proof of Proposition 3 that against the uniform attack strategy,
the interception probability will be strictly less than 2/n for any Patroller walk which repeats
a node. This observation can be used to show that in some cases oscillations on an edge cannot
be optimal. Consider the triangle graph shown in Figure 2, with T = 3. If the Patroller adopts
a random cyclic patrol, he intercepts any attack with probability 2/3. Similarly, Proposition
3 shows that the uniform attack strategy is intercepted by any walk with probability not
exceeding 2/3, and so V = 2/3. On the other hand, if the Patroller uses oscillations on edges
(or any walks other than the cycles), then he has repeated vertices and by the above remark
cannot achieve interception probability 2/3. So this example shows that in general, the Patroller
cannot restrict to walks restricted to individual edges.
Figure 2: The triangle graph
The following situation will be important in analyzing the patrolling game on the n node
line graph Ln with n even. For example, consider the edge covering of L4 consisting of the
edges (1, 2) and (3, 4) with C = 2 = n/2. The covering edges are disjoint, unlike the graph of
Figure 1.
Corollary 4 Suppose T is odd, n is even and let Q be a bipartite graph with C = n/2. Then
V = (2T − 1) / (nT ) .
Proof. Since C = n/2, we have from (4) that
V ≥ (2T − 1)
2CT =
2 (2T − 1)
2nT
=
2T − 1
nT
The result follows since for odd T we have from Proposition 3 that V ≤ (2T − 1) / (nT ).
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4.2 Even Periods T
When the period T is even, we can solve the patrolling game on any graph Q = Q (N,E)
(where N is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges of Q) by extending the notions of
covering and independence numbers to fractional forms. A more explicit solution for even T
will be obtained later for line graphs.
Let µ : E → [0, 1] assign edge weights µ (e) to every edge e so that the total weight
µˆ =
∑
e∈Eµ (e) is minimized subject to the condition that for every node i ∈ N the weights
µ (e) of the edges e incident to i sum to at least 1. Such a µ is called an optimal edge weighting
and µˆ is called the fractional covering number.
Similarly let ν : N → [0, 1] assign node weights ν (i) to every node i so that the total weight
νˆ =
∑
iν (i) is maximized subject to the condition that sum of the weights ν (i) of the two
endpoints i of every edge e is at most 1. Such a ν is called an optimal node weighting and νˆ
is called the fractional independence number. It is well known (see Scheinerman and Ullman,
2011) that µˆ = νˆ, a result that follows from either duality theory or the minimax theorem
applied to the game where the maximizer picks an edge, the minimizer picks a node and the
payoff is 1 if the node is incident to the edge and 0 otherwise. Note that, since the number
of strategies in this game is polynomial in the number of nodes of the graph, an optimal edge
weighting, an optimal node weighting and µˆ = νˆ can be found efficiently.
Theorem 5 If T is even, then the value of the patrolling game is given by V = 1/µˆ = 1/νˆ.
An optimal strategy for the Patroller is to oscillate on edge e with probability µ (e) /µˆ, where
µ is any optimal edge weighting. An optimal strategy for Attacker to fix any interval {t, t+ 1}
and attack at node i with probabiltiy ν (i) /νˆ, where ν is an optimal node weighting.
Proof. Suppose the Patroller chooses the stated mixed strategy and the attack is at node
i, in any time interval. The Patroller will intercept the attack if he has chosen to oscillate
on an interval incident to i, which has probability at least 1/µˆ because the numerater is the
sum of weights on edges incident to i. Similarly, suppose the Attacker adopts the stated mixed
strategy. Let i and j be the nodes occupied by the Patroller at the attack times t and t + 1.
If i 6= j, and e = {i, j} is the edge determined by i 6= j then the probability of intercepting
the attack is given by ν (i) /νˆ + ν (j) /νˆ = (ν (i) + ν (j)) /νˆ ≤ 1/νˆ. If i = j the same inequality
holds.
Note that if we restrict the weights µ(e) and ν(i) to being 0 or 1 we get the usual covering
number µˆ = C and independence number νˆ = I. Thus, from linear programming theory and
duality we have: I ≤ νˆ = µˆ ≤ C.
We consider, as an example, the graph depicted in Figure 3. It is not bipartite, so the
covering number and independence number are not equal. The covering number is 3, and an
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Figure 3: A non-bipartite graph
optimal covering is {ab, ac, de} (where, for example ab denotes the edge with endpoints a and
b). The independence number of the graph is 2, and a maximum cardinality independent set
is {a, d}.
One optimal edge weighting is µ (ae) = 1, µ (bc) = µ (cd) = µ (db) = 1/2 and an optimal
node weighting is given by ν (a) = ν (b) = ν (c) = ν (d) = ν (e) = 1/2. Hence µˆ = νˆ = 5/2. This
translates to an optimal Patroller strategy that oscillates on ae with probability µ(ae)/µˆ = 2/5,
and oscillates on bc, cd or bd each with probability µ(bc)/µˆ = 1/5. And it translates to an
optimal Attacker strategy of attacking at node i with probability ν(i)/νˆ = 1/5, which is
equivalent to the uniform Attacker strategy. We have V = 1/µˆ = 1/νˆ = 1/(5/2) = 2/5.
4.3 Patroller decomposition
As observed earlier in Alpern et al. (2011) the Patroller has the option of decomposing the
given graph Q into subgraphs Q1 and Q2 and randomly choosing whether to play an optimal
patrolling strategy on Q1 or on Q2. Specifically, suppose we write the node set N of Q as the
(not necessarily disjoint) union N1∪N2, and define Qi to be the graph with nodes Ni and edges
between nodes that are adjacent in Q. Let Vi denote the value of the patrolling game on Qi
(with the same parameters as on Q). If the Patroller optimally patrols on Qi with probability
pi, then any attack on a node in Qi will be intercepted with probability at least piVi. If the
Patroller equalizes these two probabilities (p1V1 = p2V2) by choosing p1 = V2/ (V1 + V2), then
he wins with probability at least
p2V2 = p1V1 =
V1V2
V1 + V2
, and hence we have
V ≥ V1V2
V1 + V2
. (5)
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The right-hand side of (5) represents the highest interception probability that the Patroller
can obtain by restricting patrols to one of the two subgraphs Q1 or Q2. So if strict inequality
holds in (5) then it is suboptimal for the Patroller to decompose Q in this way. If (5) holds
with equality, we say that the patrolling game on Q with period T is decomposable. Note that
if the game for Q,T is decomposable this means that removing edges (or barring the Patroller
from using them) connecting nodes in Q1 to nodes in Q2 does not lower the value of the game.
This derivation is simpler than that given in Alpern et al. (2011). We will use this method
to solve one of the cases for the line graph in Section 5.5.
Consider the example in Figure 3. Take N1 = {a, e} and N2 = {b, c, d} . We have V1 = 1
(an oscillation intercepts any attack at a or e) and V2 = 2/3, as shown in the analysis of the
triangle graph in Figure 2. Using the decomposition result (5), we have
V ≥ V1 V2
V1 + V2
=
2/3
1 + 2/3
=
2
5
and Proposition 3 gives
V ≤ 2
n
=
2
5
, so V = 2/5,
as shown earlier in the analysis of Figure 3, using different methods.
5 The Line Graph
We now concentrate our attention on the line graph Ln with node set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
edges between consecutive numbers. This graph is bipartite, with the two node sets made up
of the odd numbers and the even numbers. As mentioned in Proposition 2, this implies that
I = C, and we may take the odd numbered nodes as a maximum independent set, giving
I = C =

n
2 , if n is even, and
n+1
2 , if n is odd.
(6)
The solution of the periodic patrolling game on the line breaks up into five cases, as outlined
in Table 1. For the Attacker the strategies are simpler and have been defined earlier. However,
for the Patroller the strategies are more complicated and specific details for some of them can
be found at the corresponding propositions.
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Case Description Value Patroller strategy Attacker strategy
1 T, n even 2n unbiased covering strategy independent
Proposition 6 Lemma 1 Lemma 1
2 T even, n odd 2n+1 unbiased covering strategy independent
Propostion 6 Lemma 1 Lemma 1
3 T odd, n even 2T−1nT biased covering strategy uniform
Proposition 6 Proposition 2 Proposition 3
4 T, n odd, n ≥ 2T + 1 2T−1nT mixture of p-biased oscillations uniform
Propositions 9, 11 (Prop 9) or decomposed (Prop 11) Prop 7
5 T, n odd, n ≤ 2T − 1 2n+1 mixture of p-biased oscillations independent
Proposition 10 Proposition 10 Prop 7
Table 1: Solution of Patrolling Game on Ln, period T .
We give in Figure 4 a partition of (n, T ) into the five cases of Table 1. The pattern is quite
complicated.
T \ n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
3 3 5 3 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
4 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 4 3 4
6 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
7 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5
8 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
9 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5
10 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Figure 4: Cases from Table 1 for pairs of (n, T ).
5.1 Cases 1 to 3 (one of T or n is even)
If either T or n is even, there are three different forms for the value, but all follow easily from
previous results.
Proposition 6 For Ln, if T is even, then
V =
1
C =

2
n if n is even,
2
n+1 if n is odd.
(7)
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If T is odd and n is even we have
V =
2T − 1
nT
. (8)
Proof.
First suppose that T is even. In this case, the result (7) easily follows from Proposition 2
and (6), since Ln is bipartite.
For T odd and n even, there is an edge covering of Ln with C = n/2 disjoint edges of the
form {2i− 1, 2i} , i = 1, . . . , n/2. Thus the result follows from Corollary 4.
Thus the only remaining cases (4 and 5) are when T and n are both odd. These are the
complicated cases.
5.2 Comparison of uniform and independent attack strategies
For the remaining cases when T and n are both odd, we must compare the effectiveness of two
different strategies for the Attacker: the uniform strategy, mentioned above, chooses equiprob-
ably among all the nT possible pure stategies (at all n nodes at all T starting times); the
independent strategy starts at time, say, 1 and chooses equiprobably among the I indepen-
dent nodes. That is, the independent strategy chooses among I simultaneous attacks. We
have already obtained two different upper bounds on V for these cases: (2T − 1) / (nT ) from
Proposition 3, for the uniform attack strategy; and 2/ (n+ 1) from (4), for the independent
strategy (since I = n+12 ).
Note that the upper bound (2T − 1)/(nT ) is smaller than the upper bound 2/(n + 1) for
n ≥ 2T + 1 and the reverse holds for n ≤ 2T − 1. Since the Attacker can choose the attack
(uniform or independent) which gives the smaller upper bound on the value, we can summarize
his options as follows.
Proposition 7 Suppose T and n are both odd, and Q = Ln. Then
V ≤ min
(
2T − 1
nT
,
2
n+ 1
)
=

2
n+1 if n ≤ 2T − 1,
2T−1
nT if n ≥ 2T + 1.
We now analyze these two cases in sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. For the Patroller
strategies we shall use oscillations which are similar to the walks wk which appeared in the
proof of Proposition 2.
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5.3 Case 4 (T, n odd, n ≥ 2T + 1)
To deal with the case of n ≥ 2T + 1 and noting that the oddness of T requires a stunted type
of oscillation, we define p-biased oscillations as follows.
Definition 8 For p ∈ [0, 1], a right p-biased oscillation −→b p(i) (for i = 1, . . . , n − 1) is a
T -periodic walk between i and i+ 1 where i and i+ 1 alternate except that with probability p,
at a random time, the right-hand node i + 1 is repeated (if T = 2q + 1, it is at node i + 1 for
q + 1 periods and at i for q periods); with probability 1 − p, at a random time, the left-hand
node is repeated. For convenience, we define a left p-biased oscillation
←−
b p(i) as
−→
b 1−p(i).
If p = 1/2, we will refer to a right (or left) p-biased oscillation as an unbiased oscillation.
For the following result note that for larger n the uniform attack strategy is better for the
Attacker than the independent attack strategy.
Proposition 9 For Ln, assume that both T and n are odd and that 2T ≤ n − 1. Then
V = 2T−1nT . The uniform attack strategy is optimal for the Attacker and a probabilistic choice
of biased oscillations is optimal for the Patroller.
The reader is invited to read the example in Table 2 and commentary to obtain some intuition
for the proof.
Proof. From Proposition 7 we know that V ≤ 2T−1nT , so it is enough to demonstrate a Patroller
strategy which intercepts an attack at any node i with probability at least 2T−1nT .
For j = 1, . . . , (n + 1)/2, let Aj be the set of edges of the form (2i − 1, 2i) for i < j. For
example, A1 is empty and A3 = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}. Also let Bj be the set of edges of the form
(2i, 2i+1) for i ≥ j, so B1 = {(2, 3), (4, 5), . . . , (n−1, n)} and B3 = {(6, 7), (8, 9), . . . , (n−1, n)}.
Finally let Dj = Aj ∪Bj .
For example when n = 7 we haveA2 = {(1, 2)} , B2 = {(4, 5), (6, 7)} andD2 = {(1, 2), (4, 5), (6, 7)} ,
as shown by the three arrows (for edges) on the second line from the top in Table 2. The arrows
are oriented left for edges in A2 and right for those in B2 to indicate the Patroller’s use of left
or right biased oscillations on these edges in his optimal strategy.
There are (n− 1)/2 edges in Dj , and each node in the line graph except one is incident to
some edge in Dj , for each j.
Consider the following Patroller strategy. First some j is chosen uniformly at random,
j = 1, . . . , (n+ 1)/2 and an edge (i, i+ 1) in Dj is chosen uniformly at random. If (i, i+ 1) is
contained in Aj then the Patroller performs a left p-biased oscillation
←−
b p(i). If (i, i+ 1) is in
Bj then the Patroller performs a right p-biased oscillation
−→
b p(i). This probability p will be
determined later.
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If a node is either on the left of an edge in some Aj that is being patrolled or if it is on the
right of an edge in some Bj that is being patrolled, then an attack at that node is intercepted
with probability:
p · 1 + (1− p) · (T − 1)/T = (T + p− 1)/T. (9)
If a node is either on the right of an edge in some Aj that is being patrolled or if it is on the
left of an edge in some Bj that is being patrolled, then an attack at that node is intercepted
with probability:
p · (T − 1)/T + (1− p) · 1 = (T − p)/T. (10)
We first calculate the probability p2i that an attack at an even numbered node 2i is intercepted,
i = 1, . . . , (n − 1)/2. Observe that for every one of the (n + 1)/2 values of j, the node 2i is
either on the right of an edge in Aj or on the left of an edge in Bj , so
p2i =
(
1
(n− 1)/2
)(
T − p
T
)
=
2(T − p)
(n− 1)T . (11)
For an odd numbered node 2i − 1, i = 1, . . . , (n + 1)/2, we observe that there are (n − 1)/2
values of j such that the node 2i− 1 is either on the left of an edge in Aj or on the right of an
edge in Bj . There is one value of j such that node 2i− 1 is not incident to any edge in Aj or
Bj . So the probability p2i−1 that an attack at node 2i− 1 is intercepted is
p2i−1 =
(
1
(n− 1)/2
)(
(n− 1)/2
(n+ 1)/2
)(
T + p− 1
T
)
=
2(T + p− 1)
(n+ 1)T
. (12)
Since 2T ≤ n− 1 ≤ n+ 1, we may choose p = (2T + n− 1)/(2n) so that the probabilities p2i
and p2i−1 are equal, and substituting this value of p into (11) or (12), we obtain the bound
V ≥ 2(T − (2T + n− 1)/2n)
(n− 1)T =
(2T − 1)
nT
.
Combining this with our lower bound, this establishes the proposition.
We illustrate the Patroller’s optimal strategy, taking L7 as an example, with T = 3 in Table
2. The four choices of D1, . . . , D4 correspond to the four rows in Table 2. The left pointing
arrows correspond to the edges in the Aj and the right pointing arrows correspond to the edges
in the Bj . Nodes which are incident to one of the edges in Dj , are indicated by a solid disk,
those which are not, by an outlined disk.
The Patroller picks one of the rows of the table at random, and then one of the arrows
in that row at random, corresponding to an edge (i, i + 1). Equivalently, he picks one of the
12 arrows at random. Then he performs a left or right p-biased oscillation, depending on the
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
◦ • =⇒ • • =⇒ • • =⇒ • D1
• ⇐= • ◦ • =⇒ • • =⇒ • D2
• ⇐= • • ⇐= • ◦ • =⇒ • D3
• ⇐= • • ⇐= • • ⇐= • ◦ D4
Table 2: Optimal strategy for L7 with T = 3.
direction of the arrow, where p = (2T +n−1)/(2n) = 12/14 = 6/7. If a node has three arrows
pointing toward it (odd nodes), then an attack at that node is intercepted with probability
(3/12)(p+ (1− p)(T − 1)/T ) = (1/4)(6/7 + (1/7)(2/3)) = 5/21. If, on the other hand, a node
has four arrows pointing away from it (even nodes), then an attack at that node is intercepted
with probability (4/12)((1− p) + p(T − 1)/T ) = (1/3)(1/7 + (6/7)(2/3)) = 5/21. So the value
is 5/21 = (2T − 1)/(nT ).
5.4 Case 5 (T, n odd,n ≤ 2T − 1)
We now consider the remaining open case of n and T odd and n ≤ 2T − 1.
Proposition 10 For Ln, assume that both T and n are odd and that n ≤ 2T − 1. Then
V = 2n+1 . The independent strategy is optimal for the Attacker and a probabilistic choice of
biased oscillations is optimal for the Patroller.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 7 that V ≤ 2/(n + 1). To prove the reverse bound on
the value, we simply use the Patroller strategy described in the proof of Proposition 9, but
this time taking p = 1 in Equations (12) and (11) to obtain
p2i−1 =
2(T + p− 1)
(n+ 1)T
=
2
n+ 1
and p2i =
2(T − 1)
(n− 1)T ≥
2
n+ 1
,
where the last inequality follows directly from n ≤ 2T − 1. Thus, we have V ≥ 2/(n+ 1).
5.5 Patroller decomposition strategies
We may now also give an alternative optimal strategy for the Patroller in case 4, using a
decomposition of the line graph.
Proposition 11 For Ln, if T and n are odd and n > 2T − 1 then V = 2T−1nT . The uniform
strategy is optimal for the Attacker. For the Patroller there is an optimal strategy which
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decomposes the graph Q = Ln into a left graph L = LnL with the odd number nL = 2T − 1
of nodes {1, 2, . . . , 2T − 1} and a right graph R =LnRwith the remaining even number nR =
n− (2T − 1) of nodes {2T, 2T + 1, . . . , n} .
Proof. The adoption of the uniform attacker strategy guarantees that V ≥ 2T−1nT by
Proposition 3. The left graph L satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 10, because nL ≤ 2T−1
(equality holds) and T and nL are odd. Hence Proposition 10 gives
V (L) = 2
nL + 1
=
2
2T
.
The subgraphR has an even number of nodes nR, so it satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition 6,
hence equation (8) gives
V (R) = 2T − 1
nRT
=
2T − 1
(n− (2T − 1))T .
It follows from the decomposition estimate (5) that
V = V (Ln) ≥ V (L) V (R)
V (L) + V (R) =
2T − 1
nT
.
As an example, consider again the case T = 3 and n = 7 > 2T − 1 = 5, as considered in
Section 5.3. As we know, V7 = 5/21. We decompose L7 into L = L5 and R = L2. On L5, the
optimal Patroller strategy is given by Proposition 10. On L2 the optimal Patroller strategy is
an unbiased oscillation on the single edge (6, 7).
According to Section 4.3, the probabilities p5 and p2 of patrolling on L5 and L2 should
satisfy p5V5 = p2V2. Since V5 = 2/(5 + 1) = 1/3 and V2 = (2 · 3 − 1)/(2 · 3) = 5/6, we have
p5 = 5/7 and p2 = 2/7.
We may represent this strategy by the diagram in Table 3, where L7 is decomposed into
L = L5 (on the left) and R = L2 (on the right). The Patroller first chooses L5 with probability
p5 = 5/7 and L2 with probability 2/7. If he chooses L2 then he performs an unbiased oscillation
(indicated by the double-ended arrow) on edge (6, 7). If he chooses L5 then he chooses one of
the single-ended arrows at random and performs a left or right biased p-oscillation, depending
on the direction of the arrow, with p = 1.
We can now determine for which values of T and n the line graph Ln is decomposable
(equality in (5)), in the sense that the Patroller can restrict his patrols to one of two disjoint
subgraphs without loss of optimality.
Proposition 12 The patrolling game on the line is decomposable unless T and n are odd and
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
◦ • =⇒ • • =⇒ • • ⇐⇒ •
• ⇐= • ◦ • =⇒ • • ⇐⇒ •
• ⇐= • • ⇐= • ◦ • ⇐⇒ •
Table 3: Decomposed strategy for L7 with T = 3.
n ≤ 2T − 1 (case 5).
Proof. First we show that for cases 1 through 4 in Table 1, the patrolling game is de-
composable (by the Patroller). In cases 1, 2 and 3, the Patroller uses what we call covering
strategies, in that his pure patrols are on edges forming a minimum covering set. For n ≥ 4,
such as set can include the edge (1, 2) and (3, 4) and in particular the Patroller can avoid using
the edge (2, 3) . It follows that he is decomposing Ln into L = L2 and R = Ln−2 with disjoint
nodes sets {1, 2} and {3, . . . , n} . (If T is even and n = 3, then instead of using the covering
strategy involving edges (1, 2) and (2, 3) , the Patroller decomposes the game by equiprobably
oscillating on edge (1, 2) and remaining stationary on node 3 to obtain an interception proba-
bility of 1/2 = V (L3) .) For case 4, the optimal Patroller strategy given in Proposition 9 does
not decompose the game. However an optimal strategy which does decompose the game is
given in Proposition 10, where Ln, n odd, is decomposed into L = L2T−1 and R = Ln−(2T−1).
This is a strategy where the Patroller never traverses the edge (2T − 1, 2T ) .
So assume that T and n are odd and n ≤ 2T − 1 (case 5). So any decomposition of Ln is
into an even node line graph L2j , j > 0 and an odd one Ln−2j . The assumptions on T and n
are covered by Proposition 9, so we have
V (Ln) =
2
n+ 1
.
Since 2j is even, it follows from (8) in Proposition 5, that
V (L2j) =
2T − 1
2jT
.
Since n− 2j is odd and n− 2j < n ≤ 2T − 1, it follows from Proposition 9 that
V (Ln−2j) =
2
(n− 2j) + 1.
The best the Patroller can do by such a decomposition (see Section 3.2) is to obtain an
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interception probability of
V (L2j) ∗ V (Ln−2j)
V (L2j) + V (Ln−2j)
.
The difference between the unrestricted value and the restricted one is given above is
V (Ln)− V (L2j) ∗ V (Ln−2j)
V (L2j) + V (Ln−2j)
=
2
n+ 1
−
(
2T−1
2jT
)
∗
(
2
(n−2j)+1
)
(
2T−1
2jT
)
+
(
2
(n−2j)+1
)
=
4j
(n+ 1) (2j + (2T − 1) (1 + n)) > 0.
5.6 Connections to non-periodic game
Compared with games with simply a fixed time horizon T, the problem with period T is more
difficult for the Patroller, as he has the additional requirement that he has to end at the same
node as he started. However as the period gets large, this restriction is less oppressive to
the Patroller, because the amount of time he must use to get back to his start is the fixed
diameter of the graph. In this subsection we check that the limiting value of V (T, n) for the
game with period T approaches the value V (n) found for the patrolling game on the graph
Ln without periodic patrols. For m = 2 the values found in Papadaki et al. (2016) are simply
V (n) = 1/ dn/2e , that is, 2/n for even n and 2/ (n+ 1) for odd n. If we look at the values
V (T, n) for periodic patrols found for the five cases, looking back at Table 1, for cases 1, 2, 3
and 5 (case 4 does not hold as T goes to infinity), we obtain the same limiting value
lim
T→∞
V (T, n) = V (n) = 1/ dn/2e , for all n.
Of course this is not an easy way of establishing the nonperiodic result, as the periodic case
dealt with here is more complicated.
The solution of the non-periodic game on Ln as given in Papadaki et al (2016) involves
periodic patrols of different periods T1, . . . , Tk. Setting T
∗ to be the least common multiple of
{T1, T2, . . . , Tk}, we see that the solution has period T ∗. If we were seeking a solution to the
periodic game with set period T ∗ the same solution would be valid.
Let us consider the example with n = 7, m = 2 (in the non-periodic game there is no given
T ). The solution given there is as follows: with probability 1/8 adopt unbiased oscillations on
edges (1, 2) and (6, 7) and with probability 6/8 adopt a tour of Ln of period 2(n−1) = 12 that
goes back and forth between the end nodes. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Patroller oscillates between end nodes with probability 6/8 and on edges (1, 2) and
(6, 7) each with probability 1/8 in L7.
It is easy to check that the probability that the tour of Ln (of period 12) intercepts attacks
at nodes 1, 2, . . . , 7 is given respectively by 2/12, 4/12, 4/12, 4/12, 4/12, 4/12, 2/12. The 12-
cycle can be written, starting at say node 3, as 3∗, 4∗, 5∗, 6∗, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1∗, 2∗, . . . , where ∗
indicates going to the right. Note that an attack at node 4 starting at time t will be intercepted
if the Patroller following this cycle is at one of the four steps 5, 4 or 3∗, 4∗ out of the twelve
steps in the cycle, that is, with probability 4/12. The other probabilities are calculated in a
similar manner.
We now calculate the probability that the mixed strategy stated above intercepts an attack
at each node. For node 1 such an attack is intercepted with probability 2/12 by the big
oscillation and with probability 1 by the oscillation on edge (1, 2). Hence, the total interception
probability is given by (6/8)(2/12) + (1/8)(1) = 1/4. Similarly we calculate the probability
at nodes 2 and 3 as 3/8 and 1/4; by symmetry the interception probability for node 4 is
the same as node 3 and the interception probabilities for nodes 5, 6, 7 are the same as nodes
3, 2, 1 respectively. So the overall interception probabilities for nodes {1, 2, ..., 7} are given by
{1/4, 3/8, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 3/8, 1/4}. The minimum is 1/4, which is also the value of m/(n+m−
1) = 1/4, given by Papadaki el al (2016). Note that the Attacker can achieve a successful attack
with probability 1/4 by attacking equiprobably simultaneously at the nodes of the independent
set {1, 3, 5, 7}.
To compare the above analysis with the periodic game of this paper, observe that the three
oscillations used in the optimal mixed strategy above have periods T1 = T2 = 2 and T3 = 12,
with least common multiple of T ∗ = 12. So this also gives a solution to the periodic game with
n = 7 and T = T ∗ = 12. Since T ∗ is even and n is odd our formula given in Proposition 6, case
2, is 2/(n+ 1) = 1/4. The two analyses agree on the value. Note however, that the patrolling
strategy given above differs from that given by our analysis of the periodic game with T = 12
and n = 7 given in Section 4.1, Figure 1. Note also that for both patrolling strategies the
nodes which are unfavourable to attack are the penultimate nodes 2 and 6. This shows that
the Patroller strategies that we give in our analysis are not uniquely optimal. While this gives
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an alternative method of analyzing the periodic game T = 12, n = 7, it does not solve it in
general. For example it would not solve the game for, say, T = 11.
6 Multiple Patrollers on the Line
We now consider a generalization of the game, where there are k Patrollers. The Attacker’s
strategy set is the same, but his opponent chooses k periodic walks on Ln, corresponding to
k patrols. The attack is intercepted and the payoff is 1 if any of the Patrollers intercept the
attack.
Let V (k) denote the value of the game when there are k Patrollers, and write V
(k)
n for the
value of the k Patroller game on Ln. Suppose in the single Patroller game the Patroller plays
first as in the k game but then picks a Patroller randomly. Thus he wins with probability at
least V (k)/k, and hence
V (k) ≤ kV. (13)
That is, k Patrollers can intercept an attack with probability at most k times the probability
that a single Patroller can intercept an attack.
The estimate holds with equality if and only if the k Patrollers can jointly patrol in such
a way that each one is following an optimal strategy for k = 1 and furthermore no possible
attack is simultaneously intercepted by more than one of the Patrollers.
If we assume k ≤ n/2 then it is easy to adapt our optimal strategies described in the
sections above for k = 1 to the more general game where k > 1. As an example, take case 4,
with n = 7, T = 3 and k = 3. An optimal Patroller strategy for k = 1 is depicted in Table 2:
recall that the Patroller chooses one of the 12 arrows at random and performs a left or right
p-biased oscillation, depending on the direction of the arrow, where p = 6/7.
An optimal strategy for k = 3 simply chooses a row at random and assigns one of the
3 Patrollers to each arrow. This clearly implies that V
(k)
n = 3Vn. For k = 2 the Patroller
chooses a row at random and randomly assigns the 2 Patrollers to 2 of the 3 arrows. Note
that this extension to k > 1 Patrollers works for any k ≤ 3 but not for k > 3. For example
this particular argument does not work for k = 4. Note also that the alternative decomposed
strategy for case 4, described in Section 5.5 cannot be extended to k > 1 Patrollers in the same
way.
Similarly, for the other cases, as long as k ≤ n/2, the Patroller’s strategy for k = 1 can be
extended to k > 1. We omit the details, as the extensions are straightforward. Hence we have
the following theorem.
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Theorem 13 For k ≤ n/2, the value V (k)n of the k Patroller game on the line graph Ln
satisfies V
(k)
n = kVn.
It is natural to question whether, for k > n/2, the value of the game is min{kVn, 1}. Indeed,
for T even, it is easy to see that this is true, since for k > n/2, the Patroller can win the game
with probability 1 by oscillating on k covering edges.
But for T odd, it is not true. Consider the same example of n = 7 and T = 3 but this
time with k = 4 Patrollers. In this case, the bound (13) gives V
(4)
7 ≤ 4V7 = 20/21. In fact
we will show that V
(4)
7 = 19/21. Suppose the Attacker employs the uniform strategy, so that
he chooses uniformly between all 21 possible attacks. We will show that the Patrollers can
intercept no more than 19 of the attacks, so that V
(4)
7 ≤ 19/21.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that the Patrollers were able to intercept 20 of the attacks.
Then there must be 6 nodes at which all 3 attacks are intercepted, because if there were only 5
such nodes, then the total possible number of attacks that were intercepted would be at most
5 · 3 + 2 · 2 = 19. This means that each of these 6 nodes must be visited by some Patroller in
at least 2 of the 3 time periods, which accounts for 6 · 2 = 12 pairs of nodes and time periods.
But since there are only 4 Patrollers, they cannot occupy more than 4 · 3 = 12 pairs of nodes
and time periods in total. So none of the 3 attacks at the 7th node can be intercepted, so that
the total number of attacks intercepted is only 18, a contradiction. Hence, V
(4)
7 ≤ 19/21.
To see that the value V
(4)
7 is in fact exactly equal to 19/21, we present a strategy for the
Patrollers that mixes between 21 pure strategies. The strategies are indexed by pairs (i, j)t,
where (i, j) ranges over the values {(1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (1, 7), (5, 7), (5, 6), (4, 6)} and t takes the
values 1, 2 or 3. Strategy (i, j)t has the property that all 21 possible attacks are intercepted
except the two attacks that take place at nodes i and j at times (t, t+ 1) (where addition here
is modulo 3). If such patrols exist, then it is easy to check that any given attack is intercepted
by exactly 19 of the 21 patrols. This means that the mixed strategy that chooses one of these
21 pure strategies uniformly at random guarantees an expected interception probability of at
least 19/21 against any given attack, so that V ≥ 19/21.
So we just need to show that such patrols do indeed exist. Table 4 illustrates seven of the
pure strategies (i, j)t. The nodes are listed in the first row and time in the second column and
the entries in the table correspond to the four Patrollers.
This accounts for 7 of the 21 pure strategies (i, j)t, and the other 14 can be obtained from
these ones by a translation through time. For example, the strategy (5, 6)2 can be obtained
by translating (5, 6)1 in time by +1.
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Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strategy (1, 3)1 1 1 2 3 4
2 1 2 3 4
3 1 2 3 4
Strategy (2, 3)1 1 1 2 3 4
2 1 2 3 4
3 1 2 3 4
Strategy (2, 4)1 1 1 2 3 4
2 1 2 3 4
3 1 2 3 4
Strategy (1, 7)1 1 1 2 3 4
2 1 2 3 4
3 1 2 3 4
Strategy (5, 7)1 1 1 2 3 4
2 1 2 3 4
3 1 2 3 4
Strategy (5, 6)1 1 1 2 3 4
2 1 2 3 4
3 1 2 3 4
Strategy (4, 6)1 1 1 2 3 4
2 1 2 3 4
3 1 2 3 4
Table 4: Part of the optimal Patroller strategy for L7 with T = 3 and k = 4.
It is clear that for T = 3 and n = 7, the value of the game is equal to 1 for k ≥ 5, since
the addition of one more suitably placed Patroller in, say strategy (2, 3)1, results in a pure
strategy for the Patrollers that guarantees an interception probability of 1.
7 Conclusions
This paper has begun the study of periodic patrols on the line, by giving a complete solution
to the case of short attack duration m = 2. One reason that the case m = 2 is susceptible
to our analysis is that, at least for even T , the covering number can be identified with the
minimum number of patrols that are required to intercept any attack. This is not true for
large m. The periodic patrolling game is much more difficult to solve than the unrestricted
version of the game (where patrols are not required to have a given period). The latter can
be solved for line graphs of arbitrary size and arbitrary attack duration, as long as the time
horizon is sufficiently large, as shown in Papadaki et al. (2016).
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